Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm by Aharon Levran

Author:Aharon Levran [Levran, Aharon]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781135219109
Google: NRUCAwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-03-05T16:02:20+00:00

EXAMINING ISRAELI DETERRENCE POSTURE IN THE WAKE OF THE WAR

Has Israel’s future deterrence posture suffered as a result of her self-restraint in the Second Gulf War? The answer to this crucial question is far from simple and can be approached from two diametrically opposing points of view, each supported by weighty arguments.

School A: Israeli Deterrence was not Harmed

• All the Arab world knows that Israel had the desire and the military capability to retaliate against Iraq, but that it was prevented from doing so due to exceptional circumstances. These circumstances will not necessarily recur in the future, especially if Israel faces direct threats from its immediate neighbouring adversaries. In other words, in the Second Gulf War Israel did not show forbearance due to its being in a position of weakness, but rather due to sober considerations and exceptional strategic conditions.

• Others, namely the US and the Coalition forces, were doing the job for Israel. Under such convenient circumstances, why should Israel not have shown ‘sophisticated’ restraint from which she stood to gain much, namely a favourable political image, extensive financial assistance from the US and Germany, and special defence aid, including Patriot missiles?4 All this was achieved without Israel actually investing much. Syrian and Egyptian spokesmen, including President Mubarak, claimed, ‘Look how much Israel has gained only because of a few fire-works landing in her territory.’ Moreover, they added, why should Israel be so unwise as to intervene and foil the defeat of one of her stronger enemies?

Two citations are in order here. A Radio Monte Carlo correspondent reported on a letter President Mubarak sent President Bush at the beginning of the war, in which the former expressed his ‘concern about the military and economic aid to Israel.’5 At the time the Syrian foreign minister called a meeting of Europe’s ambassadors to protest to them about their ‘growing affinity to Israel.’6

• Why should Israel have become involved in military intervention contrary to the better judgement of its good friend and ally – the US – which strongly wished the IDF to stay out of the war? In wars to come, however, the Arabs would have no guarantee whatsoever that American interests would dictate that Israel refrain from striking back at them.

• This war was the first in which American units had rushed to the defence of Israel, and perhaps this attests the sense of obligation and great closeness existing between the two states. It is true that these units were sent to Israel primarily to comfort it psychologically and especially to keep it outside the circle of belligerents; yet this may have established a binding precedent on the part of the only remaining superpower in the foreseeable future to rush to Israel’s aid in wars to come. The regional parties, after all, did not fail to note that the US rushed to the aid of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

• The Arabs, like others in the Second Gulf War, witnessed what air power and advanced military technology can do even to

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